Require two independent approvers for high-risk actions, where the initiator cannot also be an approver. Cuts fraud, fat-finger errors, and insider risk at the cost of a few minutes per decision.
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Use four-eyes when the cost of a single person being wrong — or compromised — is too high:
Regulated industries (banking, pharma, aerospace) often mandate this. For unregulated work, use it anywhere the blast radius is "that's a firing / headline / lawsuit".
Two distinct people must approve the action. The initiator cannot be an approver. Often a third constraint applies: the two approvers must be from different roles or departments ("segregation of duties").
The approval is sequential or parallel:
Parallel is faster; sequential is easier to explain to auditors.
"Cannot be the initiator" includes delegates, shared accounts, and system IDs. If person A asked person B to raise the request, person A still can't approve. Rules-lawyering this is how control breaks.
Who can approve slot 1? Who can approve slot 2? Often they're different groups — e.g. slot 1 is the requester's manager, slot 2 is from finance or security. Encode this per action type.
Client-side checks are theatre. The request to record approver 2 must verify they're not the initiator and not approver 1, before accepting the action.
Approvers won't read a request carefully if you don't make it easy. Show: what's being requested, who asked, justification, related history, and the change's impact.
Action, actors, timestamps, justifications. Immutable. If your audit trail depends on log retention that rolls off in 30 days, you don't have an audit trail.
Emergencies happen. Decide in advance: is there a break-glass path with a single-approver override and mandatory post-hoc review? Or do you wait for the second approver? Both are valid — just don't invent one at 3am.
Send approval requests to multiple people simultaneously and proceed when a minimum number approve. Faster than serial chains for peer-level decisions.